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1019, is not here applicable. That section permits the tenant 
to remove trade fixtures during the term of the lease. Here 
the lease had been terminated because of covenant broken 
and the right of re-entry had attached and had been exercised. 
'fhe judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, 
J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 8, 
1957. 
[S. F. No. 19326. In Bank. Apr. 9, 1957.] 
ALBERT WALTER GARIBALDI, a Minor, etc., et al., 
Appellants, v. BORCHERS BROS. (a Corporation) 
et al., Respondents. 
[1] Automobiles-Instructions-Last Clear Chance.-In an action 
for injuries sustained by a boy when he came in contact with 
defendants' truck on a city street, where a formula instruction 
on last clear chance given at plaintiffs' request was misleading 
and confusing in its amplification of the prescribed elements 
for application of the doctrine, plaintiffs could not complain of 
the trial court's failure to include their proposed modification 
of the instruction by adding to the requirement "That the 
(truck driver) had actual knowledge of (the boy's) perilous 
situation" the words "or that (the driver) knew facts from 
which a reasonable person would have believed that (the boy) 
was in peril," since the proposed modification would have in-
creased the existing confusion in the instruction. 
[2] Negligence--Instructions-Last Clear Chance.-An instruction 
that the doctrine of last clear chance is invoked to defeat the 
defense of contributory negligence only when, after plaintiff's 
negligence has put him into a position of danger, its work as 
an efficient agent of causation ceases and it does not play a 
part in proximately causing the accident, but that when a 
person's negligence places him in a position of danger, and 
[2] Doctrine of last clear chance, notes, 92 A.L.R. 47; 119 A.L.R. 
1041; 171 A.L.R. 1365. See also Cal.Jur., Negligence, § SO; Am. 
Jur., Negligence, § 215. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 352; [2-4] Negligence, 
§ 217; [5] Automobiles, § 320; [6, 7] Automobiles, § 343-8; [8] 
Trial, § 178; [9] Automobiles,§ 322-3. 
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thereafter it or its effect continues and as a proximately 
causing factor brings about or helps to bring about the acci-
the law of contributory negligence applies and such 
person cannot recover, is not objectionable as declaring that 
if plaintiff continues to be negligent up to the moment of 
thf.; impact he cannot recover from defendant who failed to 
ex(,rcise the last clear chance to avert the accident, though 
negligence was not a proximate cause thereof, since 
sueh instruction states in effect that the doctrine does not apply 
unless plaintiff's negligence has became "remote in causation" 
:md that, if plaintiff's negligence or its effect continues so as 
to be a "proximate cause" of the accident, such negligence 
will bar a recovery. 
[3 J !d.-Instructions-Last Clear Chance.-Where an instruction 
on continuing negligence was immediately preceded by a 
general last clear chance instruction reciting the elements of 
the doctrine, including the circumstance of a negligent plain-
til{ totally unaware of his impending peril and concluding 
with the statement that if all prescribed "conditions [were J 
found" to exist "with respect to the accident in question," 
the jury "must find against the defense of contributory negli-
gence ... because under such conditions the law holds the de-
fendant liable for any injury suffered by [the J plaintiff and 
proximately resulting from the accident despite the negligence 
of [the J plaintiff," it was reasonable to assume that the jury 
realized that in cases of negligent unawareness plaintiff's 
negligence continues to the time of injury but that, if the ele-
ment of the last clear chance doctrine are present, that rule 
applies. 
[4] !d.-Instructions-Last Clear Chance.-A technical instruction 
on continuing negligence is of little, if any, assistance to the 
average jury in applying the last clear chance doctrine; 
when all essential elements for the application of last clear 
ehance are present, the negligence of defendant who failed 
to exercise the last clear chance to avoid the accident is 
deemed in law to be the sole proximate cause of the acci-
dent and may be deemed responsible to plaintiff for the re-
sulting damage despite the contributory negligence of plain-
tiff, and an instruction to that effect, coupled with proper in-
structions on the essential elements of the last clear chance 
doctrine, would give the jury a clearer understanding of the 
real issues for its determination and would avoid complicating 
its deliberations by instructions which place on the jurors 
the burden of rationalizing their findings and conclusions 
with the ordinary concepts of proximate cause. 
[5] Automobiles- Instructions- Assumption as to Conduct of 
Others.-In an action for injuries sustained by a boy when 
he carne in contact with defendants' truck on a city street, an 
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instruction that a person exercising ordinary care has a right 
to assume that others will perform their duty under the law, 
but not when it is reasonably apparent or, in the exercise of 
ordinary care, would be apparent to him that another is not 
going to perform his duty, was not erroneous as instructing the 
jury that the truck driver was entitled to assume that the boy 
would obey the law, when considered with preceding instruc-
tions which properly told the jury that a child is held only to a 
standard of care in accordance with his age and the existing 
conditions, and that the driver was only entitled to assume 
that the children would act as other children of like age 
would ordinarily act under similar circumstances. 
[6] !d.-Instructions- Contributory Negligence-Minors.-In an 
action for injuries sustained by a boy when he came in con-
tact with defendants' truck on a city street, an instruction 
that before attempting to cross a street it is a pedestrian's duty 
to make reasonable observations to learn the traffic conditions 
confronting him, that the law places on him the continuing duty 
to exercise ordinary care to avoid an accident, but that the 
degree of ordinary care in the case of a minor is that ordi-
narily exercised by a child of like age, mental capacity :md 
experience under the same or similar circumstances, emphasized 
the determinative consideration to be not whether the boy 
acted as an adult should, but whether he used the care ordi-
narily exercised by like children in similar circumstances, 
and properly left the matter of whether or not he was charg·e-
able with contributory negligence to the jury. 
[7] !d.-Instructions-Contributory Negligence- Minors.--In an 
action for injuries sustained by a boy when he came in con-
tact with defendants' truck on a city street, an instruction that 
a pedestrian crossing a road at a point other than within a 
marked crosswalk or an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection 
must yield the right of way to all vehicles on the roadway so 
near as to constitute an immediate hazard, but that such duty 
was not absolute and that the jury must determine from the 
facts whether the boy exercised the degree of care ordinarily 
exercised by a child of like age, mental capacity and experience, 
was not erroneous as absolutely requiring the boy to yield the 
right of way to the truck. 
[8] Trial-Instructions-Cautionary Instructions-Admissions.-
In a personal injury action, an instruction that evidence of 
a party's oral admissions other than his own testimony should 
be viewed with caution was proper though defendant ad-
mitted having made certain prior statements which were in-
consistent with his account of the accident at the trial, where 
there were other prior statements by him in evidence which 
at the trial he did not admit having made. 
[8] See Cal.Jur., Trial, §99; Am.Jur., Trial, §611 et seq. 
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[9] Automobiles-Instructions-Speed.-In an action for injuries 
sustained by a boy when he came in contact with defendants' 
truck on a city street, refusal of plaintiffs' requested instruc-
tion on the existence of a prima facie speed limit of 25 miles 
per hour at the time and place of the accident was not error 
where, assuming that the accident happened in an area which 
might have qualified as a residence district if properly sign-
posted, there was no evidence of signposting other than the 
mention of a single sign at some indefinite location, where the 
fastest that any witness stated the truck was traveling at any 
time was about 30 miles per hour, where the jury was fully 
and correctly instructed on the basic speed law (Veh. Code, 
§ 510), and where the jury found that the speed of the truck 
was not a vital factor in the happening of the accident. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa 
Clara County. John D. Foley, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for injuries sustained by a boy when 
he came in contact with defendants' truck on a city street. 
Judgment for defendants affirmed. 
Bruce F. Allen and Douglas, Zingheim & Allen for Ap-
pellants. 
William J. Connolly and Donald F. Farbstein for Re-
spondents. 
SPENCE, J.-Plaintiffs, father and minor son, appeal 
from a judgment in favor of defendants in an action for 
damages for personal injuries sustained by the son when he 
came in contact with defendants' truck. They maintain that 
the court committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to their 
contentions, the record does not support their position. 
The accident occurred approximately midway between in-
tersections on Sunol Street in San Jose on August 19, 1952, 
about 10 :30 a. m. Sunol Street runs north and south, and 
is 30 feet wide. There are residences on both sides of the 
street in this area. At the time of the accident, cars were 
parked solidly along the west side of Sunol Street, leaving 
two lanes of traffic open. No parking was permitted on the 
east side. A dirt strip four feet wide extended between the 
sidewalk and the curb on this east side. 
Plaintiff minor, then 8¥2 years old, and his 7-year-old 
sister were walking north on the sidewalk on the east side 
of the street. Defendants' concrete mixer truck was also 
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proceeding north on the east side of the street. The driver 
saw the children as he approached them and he kept them 
under observation until his truck reached a point about 15 
feet south of where they then were, when he looked straight 
ahead. After he had passed the children he heard a scream 
and the sound of something hitting the side of the truck. 
'rhe boy was found lying in the street near the east curb. 
A mark on the truck indicated that the point of contact was 
on the right rear mudguard, 12 feet from the front of the 
truck. 
Defendant driver testified that he first observed the chil-
dren when he was 200 to 250 feet from them; that his view 
of them was unobstructed; that his speed then was about 
20 miles per hour; that there was traffic approaching from 
the opposite direction; that his truck was proceeding about 
3 feet from the east curb; that when about 100 feet from 
the place of the accident, he reduced his speed to 15 miles 
per hour; that the children's backs were toward him and 
they did not look at him at any time; that they were "on a 
hop and a skip down the sidewalk"; and that they "kind 
of jacked toward the west of the sidewalk.'' He further 
testified that he did not see the children leave the sidewalk 
or make any movement indicating that they were going on 
the street, but he admitted having told the police officer at 
the scene of the accident that he saw the boy step to the 
curb. The driver also testified that he did not sound his horn 
as he approached the children and only "lightly applied" the 
brakes; that it was only after he heard the scream, that he 
really applied the brakes and stopped "as quickly as [he] 
could'' next to the curb. 
The boy could not remember the accident. His sister, 9 
years old at the time of the trial, testified that she and her 
brother went from the sidewalk onto the dirt strip, where 
they waited for one northbound truck to pass, and then 
"when the second one (defendants') was coming, my brother 
started to go out by the curb, and I don't think he saw the 
truck, he was looking at me, and he told me to get back on 
the sidewalk, and so I was in the dirt strip and the truck 
came along and hit him.'' A neighbor testified that while 
she did not see the boy hit, she had noticed defendants' 
truck as it passed her house, which was just before the place 
of the accident; that it swerved toward the east curb because 
of an oncoming southbound truck; and that she estimated 
defendants' truck was then going about 30 miles per hour. 
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Defendants' truck, with its load of concrete, weighed about 
15 tons. 
At plaintiffs' request, the jury was instructed on the last 
clear chance doctrine. The formula prescribing the essential 
couditions for application of that doctrine has been recently 
restated. (Brandelius v. City &; County of San Francisco, 
47 Cal.2d 729, 743 [306 P.2d 432] .) Such restatement was 
based upon the formula appearing in other decisions of this 
L:ourt. (Daniels v. City &; County of San Fmncisco, 40 Cal.2d 
614, 619 [255 P.2d 785] ; Peterson v. Burkhalter, 38 Cal.2d 
107, 109-110 [237 P.2d 977]; Girdner v. Union Oil Co., 216 
Cal. 197, 202 [13 P.2d 915] .) 
The parties first are in dispute as to whether the last 
clear chance doctrine was applicable at all here. Defendants 
daim that the evidence only shows that the boy stepped 
from his ''place of safety'' on the sidewalk or curb and into 
the roadway after he had left the truck driver's view as 
the truck proceeded past him; that until the boy entered 
the roadway he was not in a "position of danger" (cf. Dalley 
v. Williams, 73 Cal.App.2d 427, 435 [166 P.2d 595]), at 
which time he apparently ran into the rear side of the truck; 
and the truck driver therefore had no chance of avoiding 
the impact. It seems difficult to find a basis for application 
of the doctrine in view of the evidence presented and more 
particularly, in view of the account of the only eye-witness 
to the actual happening of the accident, the boy's sister. Her 
testimony indicated that as the boy walked toward the curb, 
he realized the danger of venturing into the roadway while 
trucks were passing and, in fact, told her to get back on the 
sidewalk as they waited. But assuming for the purpose of 
discussion that under any possible view of the evidence the 
last clear chance doctrine could be deemed applicable, the 
jury was instructed with respect to that doctrine and ap-
parently did not find all the necessary conditions for its 
application to exist. Plaintiffs do not challenge the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to sustain the adverse verdict, but 
they do contend that the court erred in its omission of their 
proposed modification of BAJI 205. 
[1] The instruction given by the court followed the exact 
language of BAJI 205. Plaintiffs proposed this BAJI in-
struction but had added to paragraph "Third" thereof the 
following clause, which is italicized: ''Third: That the (truck 
driver) had actual knowledge of (the boy's) perilous situa-
tion, or that (the driver) knew facts frorn wh,ich a reasonable 
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person would have believed that (the boy) was in peril." 
This italicized portion was not given. The BAJI instruc-
tion on last elear chance, in unmodified form, was analyzed 
recently in Brandelius v. City &; County of San Francisco, 
supra, 47 Cal.2d 729. It was there held to be erroneous 
as it was found to be "misleading" and "confusing" in 
its amplification of the prescribed elements for application 
of the doctrine. Plaintiffs' proposed modification of the third 
paragraph of the BAJI instruction would obviously have 
increased the already existing confusion in the BAJI in-
struction. We therefore conclude that . plaintiffs may not 
successfully complain of the failure of the trial court to in-
clude plaintiffs' proposed modification in the BAJI instruc-
tion, which instruction was given at plaintiffs' request. 
[2] Plaintiffs argue that the force of the stated last 
clear chance doctrine was nullified by the giving of the fol-
lowing instruction on continuing negligence. (BAJI 205-A, 
'fhird Paragraph) : "'rhe Doctrine of Last Clear Chance 
is invoked to defeat the defense of contributory negligence 
only in a case when, after plaintiff's negligence has put 
him into a position of danger, its work as an efficient agent 
of causation ceases, and it does not play a part in proximately 
causing the accident. When, on the other hand, a person's 
negligence not only places him in a position of danger, but 
thereafter it or its effect continues, and as a proximately 
causing factor, brings about, or helps to bring about, the 
accident, then the law of contributory negligence applies, 
and such person may not recover." Plaintiffs object to this 
instruction, claiming that it declares that if plaintiff con-
tinues to be negligent up to the moment of the impact, he 
cannot recover from the defendant who failed to exercise 
the last clear chance to avert the accident, even though plain-
tiff's negligence was not a proximate cause thereof. Such 
proposition, of course, is not the law (Doran v. City &; 
County of San Francisco, 44 Cal.2d 477, 486-487 [283 P.2d 
1]; Sills v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 40 Cal.2d 630, 639 
[255 P.2d 795]), and the instruction does not so state. The 
first sentence states in effect that the doctrine does not apply 
unless the plaintiff's negligence has become "remote in causa-
tion." (Center v. Yellow Cab Co., 216 Cal. 205, 207-208 
[13 P.2d 918] .) The second sentence states that if the 
plaintiff's negligence or its effect continues so as to be a 
"proximate cause" of the accident, then such negligence 
will bar a recovery. (Gillette v. City of San Francisco, 58 
48 C.2d-10 
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Cal..App.2d 434, 440 [136 P.2d 611].) Thus, the instruction 
is in line with the authorities dealing with the last clear 
chance doctrine which have rationalized that doctrine, in 
its relation to the doctrine of contributory negligence, on 
the basis of proximate cause. (Sparks v. Redinger, 44 Cal.2d 
121, 124-125 [279 P.2d 971] ; Girdner v. Union Oil Co., 
supra, 216 Cal. 197, 203-204; see annos: 92 .A.L.R. 47; 119 
A.I.~.R. 1041; 171 .A.L.R. 365.) 
[3] However, while this instruction may be technically 
correct, it might be argued that it could be confusing to a 
lay jury were it not for other considerations. The instruc-
tion was immediately preceded by the general last clear 
chance instruction (B.AJI 205), reciting the elements of the 
doctrine, including the circumstance of the negligent plain-
tiff totally unaware of his impending peril, and concluding 
with the statement that if all the prescribed "conditions 
[were] found" to exist "with respect to the accident in 
question," then the jury "must find against the defense of 
contributory negligence . . . because under such conditions 
the law holds the defendant liable for any injury suffered 
by [the] plaintiff and proximately resulting from the acci-
dent despite the negligence of [the] plaintiff." (Emphasis 
added.) With these instructions so submitting plaintiffs' 
right to recovery in terms of proximate cause, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that the jury realized that in this as "in 
every case of negligent unawareness plaintiff's negligence 
continues to the very time of the injury, but if the elements 
of the last clear chance doctrine are present that rule none-
theless applies." (Overacker v. Key System, 99 Cal..App.2d 
281, 284 [221 P.2d 754].) Accordingly, plaintiffs' objection 
to the instruction on continuing negligence may not prevail. 
(See Clark v. Vieroth, 141 Cal..App.2d 462, 465-466 [296 
P.2d 823].) 
[4] Before concluding this phase of the discussion we 
should state that it appears that any instruction such as 
B.AJI 205-.A, Third Paragraph, is technical in nature and is 
of little, if any, assistance to the average jury in applying 
the last clear chance doctrine. It would be more helpful, 
in our opinion, if the courts would frankly recognize that 
the last clear chance doctrine is in reality an exception to, 
or modification of, the ordinary rules making plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence a bar to plaintiff's recovery. (See Prosser 
on Torts, second ed., 1955, p. 290.) In other words, when 
all the essential elements for the application of the last 
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clear chance are present, then the negligence of the de-
fendant, who failed to exercise the last clear chance to avoid 
the accident, is deemed in law to be the sole proximate cause 
of the accident; and under these circumstances, the defend-
ant may be held responsible to plaintiff for the resulting 
damage despite the contributory negligence of plaintiff. An 
instruction to that effect, coupled with proper instructions 
on the essential elements of the last clear chance doctrine, 
would give the jury a clearer understanding of the real 
issues for its determination and would avoid complicating 
the jury's deliberations by instructions which place upon the 
jurors the burden of rationalizing their findings and conclu-
sions with the ordinary concepts of proximate cause. 
[5] Plaintiffs next contend that the jury was erroneously 
instructed that the truck driver was entitled to assume that 
the injured boy would obey the law without regard for his 
tender age. rrhe challenged instruction reads as follows : 
''A person who, himself, is exercising ordinary care has a 
right to assume that others, too, will perform their duty 
under the law, and he has a further right to rely and act 
on that assumption. Thus it is not negligence for such a 
person to fail to anticipate an accident which can be occa-
sioned only by a violation of law or duty by another. How-
ever, an exception should be noted: the rights just defined 
do not exist when it is reasonably apparent to one, or in the 
exercise of ordinary care would be apparent to him, that 
another is not going to perform his duty." (Emphasis added.) 
This instJ;_uction must be considered with the instructions, 
requested by plaintiffs, which preceded it: ''Ordinarily it 
is necessary to exercise greater caution for the protection 
and safety of a young child than for an adult who possesses 
normal physical and mental faculties. A person operating 
a motor vehicle must anticipate the ordinary behavior of 
children. The fact that they usually cannot and do not exer-
cise the same degree of prudence for their own safety as 
adults, that they often are thoughtless and impulsive, im-
poses a duty to exercise a proportional vigilance and caution 
on a person operating a motor vehicle, and from whose con-
duct injury to a child may result. (Emphasis added.) 
''The presence of children is in itself a warning requiring 
exercise of care for their safety. The conduct of children 
is unpredictable and a person operating a motor vehicle 
should anticipate their thoughtlessness and impulsiveness. A 
greater degree of care is required of a driver of a vehicle 
292 GARIBALDI v. BoRCHERS BRos. [48 C.2d 
when he knows a small child is at play than in a case where 
a person of mature discretion is involved.'' 
Considering these last mentioned instructions together, 
it is clear that the jury was properly told that a child is 
only held to a standard of care in accordance with his age 
and the existing conditions (Galbraith v. Thompson, 108 
Cal.App.2cl 617, 621 [239 P .2d 468]), and that here the 
driver 1vas only entitled to assume that the children would 
act as other children of like age would ordinarily act under 
similar circumstances. (Hilyar v. Union Ice Co., 45 Cal.2d 
30, 36-37 [286 P.2d 21].) 
[6] Plaintiffs next contend that the jury was instructed 
according to the rules required of an adult pedestrian. Such 
is not the case. At plaintiffs' request, the accepted instruc-
tion on the standard of care required of a minor was given 
(BAJI 147), the first sentence of which reads: "A child 
is not held to the same standard of conduct as an adult and 
is only required to exercise that degree of care which ordi-
narily is exercised by children of like age, mental capacity 
and experience.'' Then followed the general instruction, of 
which plaintiffs complain, as to the duty owed by a pedestrian 
while crossing a street. (BAJI 201-C.) This latter instruc-
tion, given at defendants' request but with certain modifica-
tions in recognition of the minor plaintiff's status, reads: 
"Before attempting to <~ross a street that is being used for 
the traffic of motor vehicles, it is a pedestrian's duty to 
make reasonable observations to learn the traffic conditions 
confronting him; to look to that vicinity from which, were 
a vehicle approaching, it would immediately endanger his 
passage ; and to try to make a sensible decision whether it 
is reasonably safe to attempt the crossing. ·what observa-
tions he should make, and what he should do for his own 
safety, while crossing the street are matters which the law 
does not attempt to regulate in detail and for all occasions, 
except in this respect; it does place upon him the continuing 
duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid an accident, the 
degree of m·dinary care in the ease of a minor is that ordi-
narily exercised by a child of like age, mental capacity ancl 
!'.rpcricnee, ?tnder the same or similar circumstances." (Em-
phasis added.) Thus it is clear that the instructions em-
phasized the determinative consideration to be not whether 
the minor plaintiff acted as an adult should, but whether 
he used the care ordinarily exercised by like children in 
similar circumstances. Accordingly, the matter of whether 
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or not the boy was chargeable with contributory negligence 
in the happening of the accident was a question of fact 
properly left to the jury. (Raggio v. 111allory, 10 Cal.2d 723, 
727 [76 P.2d 660] ; Richardson v. Ribosso, 120 Cal.App. 
641, 643 [8 P.2d 226]; De Nardi v. Palanca, 120 Cal.App. 
371, 376 [8 P.2d 220].) 
[7] Nor is there merit to plaintiffs' further claim that 
the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the minor 
plaintiff was required to yield the right of way to defendants' 
truck. The criticized instruction reads as follows : ''·while 
as to a roadway locality such as that involved in this ease, 
a pedestrian has a right to cross the road at any point, these 
factors of consideration enter into the question of what con-
duct is required of him in the exercise of ordinary care. 
First: If he crosses at a point other than within a marked 
crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersec-
tion, the law requires him to yield the right of way to all 
vehicles on the roadway so near as to constitute an imme-
diate hazard. Second: The amount of caution required to 
constitute ordinary care increases as does the danger that a 
reasonably prudent person, in like position, would apprehend 
in the situation. 
''This duty to yield the right of way is not an absolute 
one, and it is for you to determine from the facts, whether 
the minor plaintiff, Albert Garibaldi, exercised reasonable 
care under the circumstances, that is, the degree of care ordi-
narily exercised by a child of like age, rnental capacity and 
experience." (Emphasis added.) This instruction supplied 
the precise language that was found wanting in the cases 
to which plaintiffs refer. (Cole v. Ridings, 95 Cal.App.2d 
136, 141 [212 P.2d 597] ; Shipway v. Monise, 59 Cal.App.2d 
565, 571 [139 P.2d 60].) The second paragraph clearly and 
correctly informed the jury that the boy's duty to yield the 
right of way was not absolute, and that the basic test was 
whether he as a minor exercised reasonable care under all 
the existing circumstances. (See Gavin v. Watt, 144 Cal. 
App.2d 238, 242-243 [300 P.2d 842].) 
[8] Plaintiffs next contend that the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury, at defendants' request, that "Evidence 
of the oral admission of a party, other than his own testi-
mony in this trial ought to be viewed by you with caution." 
Plaintiffs claim that it was not proper to give this instruc-
tion because the truck driver at the trial admitted having 
made certain prior statements which were inconsistent with 
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the account of the accident as given at the trial. These ad-
missions then became a part of the driver's own testimony 
and so did not come within the "viewing with caution" rule. 
But in addition to these admissions, there were other prior 
statements of the driver in evidence which at the trial he 
did not admit having made, and which warranted the giving 
of this cautionary instruction. (See Crawford v. Alioto, 105 
Cal.App.2d 45, 50-51 [233 P.2d 148]; Freeman v. Nickerson, 
77 Cal.App.2d 40, 62 [174 P.2d 688] .) 
[9] Plaintiffs finally object to the trial court's refusal 
to give their requested instruction on the existence of a 
prima facie speed limit of 25 miles per hour in effect at the 
time and place of the accident. It will be recalled that the 
accident happened in 1952 and prior to the 1953 amendment 
of section 511 of the Vehicle Code. They claim that Sunol 
Street was in a residence district (V eh. Code, § 90), where 
the prima facie speed limit was 25 miles per hour. (Ibid, 
§ 511, subd. (b) (1).) Assuming that the accident happened 
in an area which might have qualified as a residence district, 
if properly signposted, the requested instruction was not 
proper unless there was evidence to show that speed limit 
signs were then in place at the entrance to the alleged resi-
dential district or to a contiguous residential district. (Daniels 
v. City & County of San Francisco, supra, 40 Cal.2d 614, 
624; Guerra v. Brooks, 38 Cal.2d 16, 19-20 [236 P.2d 807] ; 
Reynolds v. Filomeo, 38 Cal.2d 5, 11-13 [236 P.2d 801] .) 
'l'here was no evidence of such signposting other than the 
mention of a single sign at some indefinite location. Such 
vague and indefinite evidence was insufficient. Furthermore, 
the fastest that any witness stated that the truck was traveling 
at any time was about 30 miles per hour. The jury was 
fully and correctly instructed on the basic speed law (V eh. 
Code, § 510), and after an examination of the record, it 
reasonably appears that the jury found that the speed of the 
truck was not a vital factor in the happening of the accident. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
McComb, ,J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion holds that various instructions given 
to the jury were not prejudicially erroneous. I cannot agree. 
The same instruction on last clear chance that was given in 
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Brandelius v. City & County of San Francisco, 47 Cal.2d 
729 [306 P.2d 432], was given in this case at plaintiff's re-
quest but an addition thereto* was stricken by the court. The 
majority opinion now says as it did in the Brandelius case 
that the instruction without the addition was incorrect and 
confusing; that therefore plaintiff cannot complain of it be-
eause it was given at his request and the addition thereto (not 
given) would have added to the confusion. I reiterate the 
comments in my dissent in the Brandelius case ( 4 7 Cal.2d 
7 46) to the effect that the instruction without the addition 
was not erroneous nor confusing; that the addition was prop-
er and should have been given. Even if the unmodified 
instruction was confusing the addition should have been 
given. It in effect told the jury that it could find actual 
knowledge by defendant of the boy's perilous position if a 
reasonable person would have believed he was in a perilous 
position, that is, if the facts would justify an inference that 
defendant knew of the boy's perilous position despite his 
protests to the contrary. In Belinsky v. Olsen, 38 Cal.2d 102, 
105 [237 P.2d 645], this court pointed out that even though 
the defendant says he did not have such knowledge the facts 
may reasonably show that he did. We there stated: "The 
second factor is lacking, urges defendant, because there is 
no showing that defendant was aware of plaintiff's perilous 
position or knew he could not escape therefrom. That depends 
upon the view one takes of the evidence. It is true that 
defendant testified that he did not see plaintiff's car until he 
was directly behind it, when plaintiff drove his car into the 
line of traffic in front of him, and that plaintiff's car was in 
motion at the time of the impact. Other evidence shows, how-
ever, that defendant was looking straight ahead as he ap-
proached plaintiff's car and his view was unobstructed. It 
may be inferred therefrom that he saw plaintiff's motionless 
car extending into the line of traffic .... Under the evidence 
most favorable to plaintiff, defendant could have seen plain-
tiff's car standing in the road ahead of him for a minute before 
the impact and thus could, by the exercise of ordinary care, 
have avoided the accident." (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff 
was entitled to have the jury advised on this issue especially 
in this case where, as in the Selinsky case, defendant said he 
*The addition was: "That the (truck driver) had actual knowledge 
of (the boy's) perilous situation, or that (the driver) knew facts from 
which a reasonable person would have believed that (the boy) was in 
peril." 
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was watching the boy and his view was unobstructed. In 
Peterson v. B1~rkhalte14, 38 Cal.2d 107, 111 [237 P.2d 977], 
we said: ''Also relied upon for reversal of the judgment is 
the testimony of Burkhalter that when he first saw Peterson 
he was not aware of a possible collision. But the application 
of the doctrine of last clea14 chance t's not dependent ttpon an 
admiss'ion by the defendant that he expected that there might 
be a collision. As stated in Cady v. Sanfm·d, 57 Cal.App. 
218, 226 [207 P. 45], 'It was not necessary that appellant 
should actnally know that an accident was inevitable if he 
failed to e:re14 cise caTc. It is enough ·if the circumstances 
of which he had knowledge were such as to convey to the 
mind of a reasonably prudent man a qttestion as to whethe1· 
Tespondent wot~ld be able to escape a collision.' 
''Burkhalter compares his situation to that of the defendant 
in Johnson v. SmdhwesteTn Engineering Co., 41 Cal.App.2d 
623 [107 P.2d 417]. There the rule of last clear chance was 
held to be inapplicable because of a lack of evidence showing 
knowledge by the defendant of the plaintiff's danger. ,John-
son had fal1en asleep while driving his automobile, and there 
was no evidence that the driver of the other car was aware of 
this fact. For that reason, it was held, the defendant did 
not know that Johnson was in a position of danger, and di(1 
not have the last clear chance to avoid the collision. 
"Burkhalter knew that Peterson was oblivious to the im-
pending collision, and he exemws his failure to do anything 
to avert the accident upon the ground that he had no reason to 
expect continuing negligence on the part of Peterson. How-
ever, there is ample evidence from which the jury could de-
termine that a reasonably prudent man, knowing the facts 
of which Burkhalter was aware, should have foreseen that 
Peterson might not turn or stop his motor scooter. Under 
such circumstances, it was negligent for Burkhalter to pro-
ceed tmvard the intersection ading upon a contrary m;sump-
tion." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, in the instant case, 
defendant could be said to have known of the presence of a 
very young child on the curb especia1ly in view of the rule 
that : ''A greater degree of care is required of a driver 
towards children than towards adults. The care required is 
greater still when the driver knows that small children are 
at play in the immediate vicinity. This is so because their 
conduct is unpredictable. The driver must anticipate their 
thoughtlessness and impulsiveness. Their very presence is 
a warning requiring the exercise of eare. ·while a driver in 
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approaching a child upon a street or highway is not bound 
to guard against every possible contingency, yet where he 
sees a child in a plac·.e of danger, or might reasonably appre-
hend that if approached without warning the child would 
through fright or bewilderment place itself in danger, it is 
his duty to keep his car under such control as is reasonably 
necessary to avoid a collision. If he has know·ledge of the 
presence of children in the immediate vicinity, he may be 
charged with negligence in injuring one of them, even though 
he did not see the injured child, particularly where the injury 
occurs near the child's home or a school. A fortiori, the driver 
may be held responsible where he sees the child approaching 
the path of his vehicle. 
''The driver may be liable under the doctrine of last clear 
chance for an injury to a child, even under the assumption 
that the child's conduct amounted to contributory negligence, 
where he sees the child in the path of his vehicle in danger 
of being run over and realizes that the child is unaware of 
the approach of the vehicle." (7 Cal.Jur.2d, Automobiles, 
§ 271; see also 30 A.L.R.2d 5.) In Swndalis v. Jenny, 132 
Cal.App. 307, 310 [22 P.2d 545], it was held that defendant 
was negligent as a matter of law where a child ran into the 
side of his car, and on the issue of contributory negligence 
the court said : ''The next question is, was the plaintiff guilty 
of contributory negligence? To this question there can be but 
one answer, and that is in the negative. Even if it were negli-
gence for a child of three years of age to stand in or near 
the center of a city street and look down, apparently un-
aware of the approach of an automobile, we are unable to see 
that such negligence contributed proximately to the injury 
that came to him by reason of the negligence of the defendant 
in the manner hereinbefore stated. By the exercise of ordi-
nary care defendant should have seen and realized that plain-
tiff was unaware of the approach of the automobile, and his 
failure so to do placed upon him the whole blame for the 
accident." In Hilyar v. Union Ice Co., 45 Cal.2d 30, 36 [286 
P.2d 21], quoting from Conroy v. Perez, 64 Cal.App.2d 217, 
224 [148 P.2d 680] : " 'The presence of children is in itself a 
warning requiring the exercise of care for their safety .... 
Moreover, if the evidence shows that a driver has knowledge 
of the presence of children he may be held to have been re-
sponsible although it appears that he did not see the injured 
child in time to prevent the injury .... ' ... In Freeland v. 
Jewel Tea Co., 118 Cal.App.2d 764, 769 (258 P.2d 1032], it 
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was held that it is ordinarily necessary to exercise greater 
care for the protection and safety of young children than 
for adult persons possessing normal and mature faculties 
(Conroy v. Perez, supra, 64 Cal.App.2d 217, 224); that their 
conduct is unpredictable and one operating a motor vehicle 
should anticipate their thoughtlessness and impulsiveness 
(Shannon v. Central-Gaither U. Sch. Dist., supra, 133 Cal. 
App. 124 [23 P .2d 769]). It was also held that the presence 
of children is in itself a warning requiring the exercise of 
care for their safety." (Emphasis added.) 
Hence in the instant case defendant was bound to antici-
pate unpredictable action by the child who was playing along 
the curb. Knowing the child was there, and the likelihood 
of his going into the street, defendant had the duty to take 
precautions, but he took none. The added portion of the in-
struction requested by plaintiff should therefore have been 
given because it took into consideration the factors involved 
in a child's presence on the street and what defendant was 
required to anticipate in regard thereto. 
The next instruction given is also clearly erroneous.* Con-
trary to the statement in the majority opinion, this instruc-
tion advised the jury that the last clear chance doctrine was 
not applicable if plaintiff's negligence continued up to the 
time of the impact. So interpreted it is conceded to be wrong; 
indeed the majority opinion says such instruction should not 
be given. The instruction states that the doctrine may apply 
"only" when plaintiff's negligence has ceased; and where 
plaintiff's negligence "contim~es" up to the time of the acci-
dent, he cannot recover because of his contributory negligence. 
The majority seeks to escape this interpretation on the as-
sumption that the continuance of plaintiff's negligence is said 
to cease if it is no longer the proximate cause of the accident. 
The proximate cause feature would only confuse the jury be-
cause, as pointed out in the majority opinion, it is fictional 
reasoning to say that the last clear chance is based on the 
theory that where applicable, the plaintiff's negligence has 
*''The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance is invoked to defeat the defense 
of contributory negligence only in a case when, after plaintiff's negligence 
has put him into a position of danger, its work as an efficient agent 
of causation ceases, and it does not play a part in proximately causing 
the accident. When, on the other hand, a person's negligence not only 
places him in a position of danger, but thereafter it or its effect 
continues, and as a proximately causing factor, brings about, or helps 
to bring about, the accident, then the law of contl'ibutory negligence 
applies, and such person may not recover.'' 
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ceased to be the proximate cause of the accident. Here the 
jury was told that if plaintiff's negligence ceased before the 
impact the doctrine applied as it was not then the proximate 
cause of the accident. No one should expect the jury to fol-
low such intricate and finespun reasoning. To the jury the 
plaintiff is still negligent, he continues to be so and the jury 
would naturally so assume; his negligence would still be a 
cause of the accident to them even though the defendant 
could have avoided it by the exercise of ordinary care. But 
they are told that they may not mitigate snch an anomalous 
situation by the application of the last elear chance doctrine. 
This is especially true in this case where we have a child 
involved and consideration must be given to defendant's 
duty in respect to a child on the curb in close proximity 
to his moving truck. The jury would normally assume that 
the child's actions would be negligent if he were an adult 
and his negligence continued up to the time of the accident 
and were one of the causes of the accident. Moreover, the 
instruction defining proximate cause informed the jury that 
a cause which produces injury, is proximate.* The jury was 
further instructed that ''. . . if you further find that the 
negligence of both proximately caused the accident, then if 
you so find, your verdict must be for the defendants." It 
is reasonable to suppose that the jury would conclude that 
conduct of the child helped produce the injury-was a proxi-
mate cause and the jury would not therefore apply the last 
clear chance doctrine under the instrnrtion now discussed. 
Likewise the instruction told the jury that defendant had 
a right to assume that the child would perform his duty 
and obey the law, and hence, if he did not anticipate such 
conduct by the child, there was no negligence. It is true, 
as stated by the majority, that thereafter the jury was in-
structed as to what conduct to expect from a child, but that 
instruction did not cure the one plaintiff attacks. The in-
structions are conflicting, as the jury was told in one breath 
that defendant need not anticipate that a child might act 
as an adult-reasonably and aceording to law-and in the 
next, that a child's actions are not measured the same way 
*''The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural 
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, 
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. 
It is the efficient cause, the one that necessarily sets in operation the 
factors that accomplish the injury. It may operate directly or through 
intermediate agencies or through conditions created by such agencies." 
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as an adult's. In the instructions with reference to the 
conduct of children the jury vvas not informed that defendant 
should "anticipate" unpredictable action by a child. The 
jury would be confused because, it would not know whether 
to apply the adult standard or child standard in evaluating 
defendant's conduct, and this was the very essence of plain-
tiff's case, that is, whether knowing that the child was play-
ing at the curb, defendant took proper precautions, or could 
proceed with the assumption that the child would not run 
out into the street. 
The error in the instruction now discussed was further 
emphasized by the giving of instructions on the duty of a 
pedestrian in crossing a street phrased in the terms of an 
adult pedestrian-that he must yield the right of way when 
not crossing in a crosswalk. This is also in conflict with the 
duty imposed upon the defendant to anticipate the conduct 
of a small child, and, in effect, negatives it. 
Considering all of the foregoing instructions, it is evident 
that the jury was placed in a position where it could not 
apply the appropriate duty of defendant toward a child 
playing near the curb of a street nor measure the child's 
duty under the circumstances. The instructions were irrecon-
cilable. Defendant, knowing of the child's presence, playing 
near the street, oblivious to defendant's truck, also knew, 
or was bound to know, that the ehild was likely to enter the 
street, yet he did nothing to cope with such a contingency. 
He did not slow down his truck, come to a stop or sound 
his horn. Under these circumstances, the jury could have 
found, if properly instructed, that he had a last clear chanee 
to avoid the accident but failed to avail himself of it. 
The last clear chance doctrine like res ipsa loquitur was 
evolved by great liberal minded judges to ameliorate the 
rigor of the common law in its application to the law of 
negligence. (See, excellent article by Myron L. Garon, mem-
ber of the Los Angeles Bar, entitled ''Recent Developments 
in California's Last Clea1· Chance Doctrine," 40 Cal.L.Rev. 
404.) It is my view that these doctrines should be applied 
liberally to the end that relief may be granted to those who 
suffer injuries as the result of the negligent conduct of others. 
The application of these doctrines has been greatly restricted 
by recent decisions of this eourt which indicate a marked 
conservative trend. (Rodabaugh v. Tekus, 39 Cal.2d 290 [246 
P.2d 663] ; Doran v. City &: County of 8an Francisco, 44 
Cal.2d 477 [283 P.2d 1] ; Brandeli11s v. City & County of 
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S. F., 47 Cal.2d 729 [306 P.2d 432]; Leonard v. Watson-
ville Community Hospital, 47 Ca1.2d 509 [305 P.2d 36]; 
Danner v. Litk1>ns, 47 Cal.2d 327 [303 P.2d 724]; Barrera 
v. De La Torre, ante, p. 166 [308 P.2d 724], filed March 
22, 1957.) ·whether this conservative trend is in accord with 
public interest may be open to serious question. In my opinion 
it is more in keeping with the public interest that these 
doctrines be liberally applied by our courts. 
I would therefore reverse the judgment. 
[Crim. No. 5981. In Bank. Apr. 9, 1957.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOHN E. CHEARY, 
Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-Murder in First Degree-Killing in Perpetration of 
Certain Felonies.-To prove defendant guilty of first degree 
murder on either the ground that the deceased's death resulted 
from injuries inflicted on her by defendant in an attempt to 
rape her or in the perpetration of a burglary by breaking and 
entering the home of deceased's daughter with intent to rape 
the daughter, it was incumbent on the prosecution to prove 
that defendant had the specific intent to rape when he entered 
the daughter's home or that he had the specific intent to rape 
when he assaulted the deceased. 
[2] Id.-Evidence.-Regardless of whether or not defendant in a 
first degree murder case had the intent to rape deceased's 
daughter when he went to the daughter's home, the jury could 
reasonably infer, from his forcing open the door and grabbing 
the daughter after being informed that he was not welcome, 
that defendant then had the specific intent to rape. 
[3] !d.-Defenses-Intoxication: Province of Court and Jury.-
If defendant in a murder case was so intoxicated that he did 
not, as charged, have the specific intent to rape either the de-
ceased or her daughter at the time he went to the daughter's 
(1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 77; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 39. 
McK. Dig. References: (1, 13] Homicide, § 15( 6); [2] Homicide, 
§145(3); [3] Homicide, §§28, 163; [4] Homicide, §159; [5, 6] 
Jury, § 103(7); [7, 9] Criminal Law, § 522; [8, 10) Criminal 
Law, § 524; (11] Homicide, §§ 185, 190; [12] Homicide, § 267; 
[14] Criminal Law,§ 331; [15] Criminal Law,§ 1404; [16] Crimi-
nal Law, § 1086; [17] Criminal Law, § 1402; [18, 19] Criminal 
Law,§ 1404(13); [20, 21] Criminal Law,§ 619; (22] Criminal Law, 
§ 617; [23, 25] Criminal Law,§ 1404(12); [24] Criminal Law,§ 624. 
